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Aggregate Savings in the Presence of Private and SocialInsurance
ABSTPJCT
Inthe presence of uncertain lifetimes, social security has the
characteristics of an annuity: a consumer pays a tax when young in exchange
for receiving a social security benefit if he survives to be old. If
consumers have identical ex ante mortality probabilities, then a fully
funded social security system would offer a rate of return equal to the
actuarially fair rate available on competitively supplied private annuities.
In this case fully funded social security would be a redundant asset and
would have no effect on consumption or national saving.
In this paper, consumers have different (publicly known) ex ante
mortality probabilities and consequently can buy actuarially fair private
annuities offering different rates of return. If the social security system
does not discriminate on the basis of cx ante mortality probabilities, then
the introduction of social security induces a redistribution of income
from consumers with a high probability of dying young to consumers with a low
probability of dying young. Under homothetic utility this redistribution
reduces aggregate bequests and aggregate consumption of young consumers in the
steady state; the steady state national capital stock can either increase
or decrease. If consumers display at least as much risk aversion as the
logarithmic utility function, then average steady state welfare is increased







Over the last decade there has been a lively debate over the effects
of social security on consumption and capital accumulation. This debste has
distinguished between a pay-as-you—go social security system and a fully
funded social security system. A balanced-budget pay-as-you-go systei
levies taxes on young consumers and uses the taxrevenue to paythe social
security benefits of old consumers. In a standard overlapping generations
modelin whichconsumers have no bequest motive (e.g. Diamond (1965)), the
saving of young consumers is reduced both by the tax they pay when they
areyoung andby the benefit they receive when they are old. Thus, the private
(andnational) capital stock is reduced by the introduction ofpay—as-you—go
social security (See Feldstein (1974)). However, if consumers obtain
utility from the utility of their heirs, as well as from their own cor.su.mDtion,
then the introduction ofpay-as-you-go social security will not affect
consumptionorprivate capital accumulation; as shown by Barro (1974),
consumers will adjust their bequests in order to offset the lump-sum
intergenerational transfers imposed by the social security system.
In contrast to pay—as-you-go social security, the introduction of
fully funded social security has no effecton consumption or the national
capital stock, regardless of whether or not consumers have bequest motives.
Thereason for the irrelevance of fully funded social security is that the
implicit rate of return on social security is the same as the rate of return
on private wealth. Consumers will offset an increase in social security
taxes and benefits by reducing private saving while maintaining unchanged
consumption.
Inorder for fully funded social security to affect consumption and
the national capital stock, the rate of return on social security must differ—2—
from the rate of return on privately traded assets. If consumers have
random dates of death, then a social security system which taxes young
consumers and gives benefits only to consumers who survive to old age has the
characteristics of an annuity. The gross rate of return on this publicly
provided non-tradable annuity will exceed the rate of return on private
assets which are not contingent on survival. If there is no private annuity
market, and ifconsumershave nobequestmotive, then the introduction
of fully funded social security reduces the steady state national cajital ztock
and narrows the distribution of wealth (See Abel (l985a)). However, if
there were a competitive annuity market, then the rate of return on private
annuities would equal the rate of return on social security and hence social
security uld have no effect.
The possibility for fully funded social security to have an effect
on the consumption and portfolio decisionsinthe presence of a competitive
annuitymarketarises when we introduce heterogeneous ex. ante mortality
probabilities.If, as in actualpractice, the socialsecurity systen does
notdiscriminate across individuals in a cohort according to the probability
of death, then social security has real effects under two alternative
information structures. First, if annuity companies know the ex ante mortality
probability of each individual, then a competitive annuity market will
provide annuities with different rates of return to consumers with different
mortality probabilities. Clearly, in such a case, some individuals must
face different rates of return on private annuities and on social security.
In general, the consumption and investment decisions of these people will
be affected by changes in social security. Alternatively, if an individual's
ex ante mortality probability is private information observable only by that
individual, then heterogeneity introduces adverse selection into the private
annuity market. However,the social security system is immune to the problem—3—
of adverse selection because of the compulsory nature of social security
taxes and benefits. Again, for at least some consumers, the rate of return
on social security differs from that on private annuities so that the consumptior
aridportfoliodecisions of these people are affected by changes in the level
ofsocial security. Inthis paper, I assume the first structure
ofinformationi.e., public information; in a companion paper (Abel (1985b))
I make the alternative assumption of private information.
In order to analyze the effects of social security on steady
state welfare, it is not sufficient to determine the effect on the steady
state capital stock, especially in an economy with heterogeneous consumers.
The effectson theaggregate capital stock and aggregate welfare can be in
opposite directions for two reasons: first, well-known Golden Rule
considerationsimply that aggregate consumption and the aggregate capital
stockcan move in opposite directions; second, and more importantly, it will
be shown that social security narrows the steady state cross-sectional
distribution of consumption which tends to increase average steady state
welfare.
Much of the existing literature on uncertain lifetimes examines the
consumptionand portfolio behavior of an individual, taking as given any
wealth received by the individual in the form of bequests.1 In the next
two sections of this paper, I also analyze the individual consumer's decision
problem. In section II, I state and solve the consumption and portfolio
decision problem of a consumer who lives for either one period or two periods
and who can hold his wealth in the form of riskless bonds and actuarially
fair annuities. As a step toward analyzing the aggregate behavior of hetero-
geneous consumers, I show in section III that consumption and bequests are
increasing functions of expected lifetime wealth. In addition, for a given
value of expected lifetime wealth, consumption and bequests are increasing—4—
functions of the probability of dying young.
After examining individual behavior, I then analyze steady state
behavior allowing for the eridogenous adjustment of bequests using an
extension to uncertain lifetimes of the Modigliani-Bruxnberg (1954) -
Samuelson(1958) -Diamond(1965) overlapping generations model. Previously,
Abel (1985a,b), Eckstein, Eichenbaurn and Peled (1985) and Sheshinski and Weiss
(1981) have examined uncertain lifetimes in an overlapping generations
framework. Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) assumed that all consumers in a
given cohort have identical ex post mortality experiences whereas Abel
(1985a,b) and Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985) allow for consumers with
the same ex ante mortality probabilities to have different mortality
experiences ex post. By allowing ex post mortality experiences to differ, these
models generate intra-cohort variation in bequests and have implications
for the intergenerational transmission of inequality. In this paper, I allow
for different ex post mortality experiences, but the presence of actuarially
fair annuities eliminates the intra—cohort variation in bequests received
and left by members of a given cohort with identical ex ante mortality
2
probabilities.
In section IV, I analyze steady state consumption and bequest
behavior and present sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique
steadystate. Then I demonstrate that the steady state values of consumption
and bequests are higher for families with a high probability of dying young.
In addition, Ishowthat fully funded social security narrows the steady-state
intra—cohortdistributions of consumption and bequests. In sectionV1I
restrict the analysisto homothetic utility functions and show that fully
fundedsocial security reduces steady state aggregate bequests and steady
state aggregate consumption of young consumers. The steady state aggregate
private capital stock is crowded out by a degree greater than, equal to,—5—
or less than one-for-one depending on whether the steady state consumption
of young consumers is less than,greaterthan, or equal to the inheritances
received. Then in section VI, I show that if utility function is sufficiently
concave (more concave than logarithmic utility), then average steady state
welfare is increased by the introduction of fully funded social security.-6-
ConsumrtiOfl and Portfolio Behavior of an Individual
In this section we analyze the consumption and portfolio behavior
of an individual consumer who does not know when he will die. We show that
f the consumer can buy actuarially fair annuities, and if the utility
from leaving a bequest is independent of the consumer's date of death,
then the consumer will leave the samebequestwhether he dies young or old.
Furthermore, as shown by Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), the consumer will
hold riskless bonds to provide for his bequests and will hold annuities to
provide for consumption when old.
Consider consumers with the following life-cycle of events:
At birth, each consumer receives an initial inheritance I from his parent.
During the first period of his life the consumer earns a fixed labor
income Y, pays a social security tax (T<Y) and consumes anamountc1. At
the end of the first period, the consumer selects a portfolio to carry his
wealth, I+Y-T-c1, to the next period. There are two assets: an actuarially
fair annuity and a riskless bond. One unit of output invested in the
annuity yields A units of output to the consumer if the consumer survives
to the second period; if the consumer dies after one period, his estate
receives nothing from the annuity. Let Qdenotethe number of units of
outputthat the consumer invests in an annuity. The consumer invests the
remainder of his wealth 14-Y-T-c1—Q in a riskless bond which pays a gross
rate of returnR to the consumerifhesurvives, ortohis estate if he
dies after oneperiod.
At the beginning of the second period, the consumer gives birth
to G>l children. There is a probability pthatthe consumer dies at the
beginning of the second period after giving birth to G heirs. If the
consumer dies at the beginning of the second period, each of his heirs—7—
receives a bequest BD/G, where ED is equal to the consumer's riskiess




If the consumer survives in the second period, he receives a
social security payment S (5>0) in addition to the principal and interest on
his portfolio of bonds and annuities. The consumer then consumes an
amount c2 and gives the remainder of wealth, BS, to his heirs, where
BS (I+YT Q)R +QA+S-
c2
(2)
Thistotal bequest, ES, is divided equally amongtheconsumer's G children.
At the end of thesecond period, the consumer dies. Because we have
assumed that the consumer does not live beyond the second period, all uncertainty
is resolved at the beginning of the second period. Therefore, the bequest,
BS, can be given to the consumer's heirs at the beginning of the second period,
i.e.,at the beginning of the first period of his heirs' lives. Thus, we can
assume, as stated above, that all inheritances are received at birth.3
The consumer's utility function is assumed to be additively separable.
In particular, the utility function is specified as
U(c1) +(l—p)6U(c2)
+p5V(BD)+(l—p)V(B5) (3)
where ó>o is the one—period discount factor, U( )isthe utility index of the
consumer's own consumption and V( ) is the index of utility derived from
leaving a bequest. We assume that U( ) and V( )arestrictly concave and




The utility function in (3) can be viewed simply as the expected value of utility—8—
where the only uncertain element is the consmer's date of death. Since the
utility function is a function of the bequest left to the consumer's heirs, it
is an example of what Yaari (1965) has called a "Marshall utilityfunction".4'5
The consumer's optimization problem is to maximize (3) subject to (1)
and (2). Substituting (1) and (2) into (3) and then differentiating with
respect to C1,C2,and Q, respectively, yields
U'(c1) =6R[pV'(BD) +(].—p)V'(BS)] (4a)
U' Cc2) =V.(ES) (4b)
pRV'(BD) =(l—p)(A—R)V' (BS) (4c)
We now assume that annuities are actuarially fair which implies that
R =(l—p)A (5)
That is, the eçected return on an annuity is equal to the return on a
riskless bond. Substituting (5)into (4c) yields
V1 (BD) =Vt(BS) (6)
The strict concavity of V( ) then implies that BD =BS.Let B =ED=BS
denote the optimal level of bequests. SinceBS =ED,it follows imrnediatel
from ecuations (1)and (2) that
c2=QA+S (7)
Thus,in the presence of a market for actuarially fair annuities,
annuities are used to provide for second-period consumption and riskiess
bonds are used to provide for bequests, and shown by Sheshinski and Weiss—9—
(1981). The interpretati.on of (7) that second-period consumption is
equal to the payoffs from annuities recognizes that the social security
payment S is contingent on survival and thus is appropriately viewed as
an annuity. It is clear from (7) that if the social security benefit S is
less than second-period consumption c2, the consumer will hold a positive
amount of annuities. Alternatively, if S is greater than c2, then the
consumerwould want a negative position in annuities. If actuarially fair
-life insurance (which pays a gross rate of returnto the consumer's estate
if he dies young and pays zero if he dies old) is available, then the consumer
can,by holdinglifeinsuranceand bonds,6achieve the samepayoff structure
asprovided by a negative holding of annuities.-10—
III.The Effects of Changes in the Probability of Death and Changes in Wealth
Inthis section we calculate the effects of variation in the
probabilityof death and variation in expected lifetime wealth on consumption
and portfolio decisions. We will show that consumption at each age and
bequests are increasing functions of the expected present value of lifetime
wealth. Also, for a given level of expected lifetime wealth, consumption at
each age and the amount of bequests are increasing in p. These results will
be useful in later sections when we aggregate over consumers with different
probabilities of dying.
The income expansion path is easily derived from (4a,b) and (6)
U'(c1) =fSRV'(B)=RU'(c2) (8)
dc2 dB The strict concavity of U( ) and V( ) implies that >0and >0along
1 1
the income expansion path. Furthermore, because consumers can buy actuarially
fair annuities, the income expansion path is independent of p.
The choice of c1, c2 and B is constrained by a lifetime budget
constraint. Using (1), (2), (5) and the fact that B =BS=BD,the lifetime
budget constraint can be written as7
c1 + (l—p)R1c2 +R1B =W (9)
where W E I + Y -T+ (l-p)R1S.
According to (9), the expected present value of lifetime purchases (of
consumption and of bequests) is equal to expected lifetime wealth. The
optimal values of c1, c2, and B are determined by the intersection of the
income expansion path in (8) and the lifetime budget constraint in (9).
Given the fixed value of R, the optimal values of c1, c2, and B can
each be expressed as functions of W and p. Clearly, c1, c2 and B are each—"-
increasing functions of W. As for the effect of an increase in p,
note that if some bundle (c1, C2, B) satisfies (9), then an increase in
p holding W constant will make the relevant expected present value of
purchases on the left hand side of (9) smaller than W. Hence, c1, C2,
and B will all be increased along the expansion path until the budget
line (9) is satisfied. Therefore,we have
c. =c.(W,p); >o, >o; i =1,2 (iDa)
B =B(W,p); ->0, > 0. (lOb)
We have shown that the partial effect of an increase in p, holding w constant,
is to increase c1, c2, arid B. However, since W =I+ '- T+ (l-p)R is,
an increase in p will, if S > 0, decrease W andtend to offset the increases
in c1, c2, and W. Of course, if S =0,then this offsetting effect is absent.
In general, the total effect of an increase in p is to increase(decrease)
c1, C2, and B ifS is less (greater) than c2. If S =C2,
then the consumer
holds no private annuities or life insurance and the optimal values of c1, C2,
and B are invariant to p.
in addition to determining the qualitative effect of W on E as above,
it will be useful to calculate the magnitude of this effect. Totally
differentiating the lifetime budget constraint (9) with respect to c1, c2,
B and W yields
dc1 + (l-p)R1dc2 +R1dB =dW (ii)
Logarithmically differentiating the income expansion path (8) yields—12--
O(c1) ____ dc=— dB (12a)
C1
1 B
(c2) o(B) dc = dB (12b)
c2
2 B
where O(c)E —cU"(c)/U'(c)>O is the coefficient of relative risk aversion
for the utility index U( ) and cY(B)E -BV"(B)/V'(B)>O is the coefficient




a (B) c —l o(B) c2 —l
where (p, C1, c2, B)
0(c1)
+(l—p)RGo j—+ R (13b)—13—
IV. The Steady State Cross-Sectional Distributions of Consumption and Bequests
In this section we demonstrate that if R<G, then there exists a
unique positive steady statelevelof bequests. It is well-known from the
Golden Rule literature that R<G characterizes a dynamically inefficient
steady state, and hence we would also like to analyze steady state behavior
under the alternative assumption that R>G. However, if R>G, then the
existence of a positive steady state level of bequests depends on the
parameters of the utility function as well as on R and G; we defer
discussion of the existence of a positive steady state level of bequests
with R>G until section V where we restrict attention to homothetic utility.
However, before restricting the utility function to be homothetic, we are
able to show in this section that the introduction of fully funded social
security narrows the steady state distributions of consumption and bequests.
Inprevious sections we derived the optimal consumption and
portfolio behavior of an individual with probability p of dying afterone
period.Henceforth, we assume that all descendents of an individual face
the same probability p as theindividual.However, we allow forheterogeneity
ofp across members of the same cohort and we indexconsumersby their
probabilityof dying after one period. We will say that a consumer is a
typepconsumerifhis probability of an early death is equal to p. In
order to rule out a known date of death, we assume that 0 <p<1.Let H(p)
be the fraction of consumers in each cohort who have a probability of
early death less than or equal to p. Letpbe the population average
1
probability of early death so that p =IpdH(p). In order to ruleout
0
aggregate uncertainty, we assume that a fraction p of type p consumers does
indeed die early. Thus p is the fraction of consumers of each cohort who die
early.
Since each consumer has G children, the assumption that a consumer's—14—
bequest is divided equally among his heirs implies that I =B/G.(The
consumer born in period t receives an inheritance I and leaves a total
bequest B.) Using (lOb) it follows that the sequence of bequests in a
family with a given probability of dying, p, evolves according to the first-
order nonlin€ar difference eution
=t-l
+Y-T+A'S,p) (14)
A steady state level of bequests, B*, must satisfy the difference
equation (14) with B. Below we specify a siTnjle sufficient
condition for the existence of a unique positive steady state level of
bequests.
Proposition 1. If R<G, then there exists a unique steady state
level of bequests B*>O.
Proof. Existence: Since urn V' (B) =,theoptimal bequest is
B-O
positive if (B_i/G) +Y—T+A'S>O.Therefore, since Y —T+ A'S>O,
if B=O, then Bt>Bti. Observe from (9) that, setting I =Bi/G
we have
c1 +(p)R'c2+ R'Bt =t_i/GY-T+A15




+ + (l_P)c2, -R(Y—T+A1S) (16)
Since lim V'(B) =0and U'(c)>O for finite c, it follows that Rc, +(l_p)c2
B-'°
exceeds R(Y-T+A1S) for sufficiently large Bt1. Therefore, for large
enough Bt1 the right hand side of (16) is positive and hence Bt<Bti.
Since Bt= B((Bu/G) + Y—T+A1S,p) is a continuous function, there exists
some B*>0 such that B* =B(B*/G+Y_T+A'S,p).—15—
Uniqueness: It suffices to show that dBt/dBt 1<1 at any positive






It follows (l3b) that G(p, c1, C2,B)>GR1so that if G>R, then
G(p, C1,C2, B)>l. q.e.d.
To establish the existence of a unique steady state when R>G we
need some additional restrictions on the utility function. We postpone
the analysis of this case until section V when we introduce homothetic
utility. The following useful proposition allows us to characterize the
steady state cross-sectional distributions of consumption and bequests. Note
that it does not require R<G.
Proposition 2. If there exists a unique positive steady state level
of bequests, then B/aW<G when evaluated in the steady state.
Proof. Since urn V'(B)=°, it follows that if BtiO then Bt>B1=O.
B-*O




+Y-T+AS,p) -B1.O as B1..B* (18)
The proposition follows immediately from (18). q.e.d.
We can now compare the steady state behavior of families with
different probabilities of dying young. We begin by comparing bequests.
Let B*(p) denote the steady state level of bequests for a type p family.
Proposition 3. If there exists a unique B*(p)>O for every p, and if
the social security payment S>O is sufficiently small, then dB*(p)/dp>O.-16-
Proof. Observe fron (14) that B* satisfies
E((B*/G) +Y-T+(l-p)R1S,p) (19)
Ttalvdifferentiating(9 with respect to B* and p yields
(1 -C' )dB=( -R1S ) dp (20)




<1when evaluated at B* (Proposition 2) .Therefore,
t-l
the coefficient of dB* in (20) is positive. Recall from (lob) that 2. >o
so that for small enough S, the coefficient of dp is also positive.
Therefore dB*/dp>O. q.e.d.
One may be tenpted to explain Proposition 3 by arguing that an
increase in p is an increase in the frequency with which people die
young leaving large bequests. However, we have shown that with a market
for actuarially fair annuities, consumers leave the same bequest whether
they die after one period or after two periods. The explanation for
Proposition 3 is that, provided S is small, an increase in p reduces the
expected present value of expenditures on the left side of the budget constraint
(9) for given values of c1, c2, and B. Provided that s>o is small, (in
particular, if S<c2), the reduction in expected expenditure exceeds the
reduction in expected lifetime wealth on the right hand side of (9)
,thereby
permitting the consumer to increase C1,C2 andB. This reasoning suggests
the following Corollary.
Corollary 3.1. If there exists a unique positive steady state level
of bequests and if the social security payment S>O is sufficiently small,
dc.
then —i>0,il,2. dp—17-
Procf. Observe that for i =1,2,c.* =cNE*/G)+Y-T+(l)ls,)
ci dB*
0, > Dand >0. q.e.d.
We now consider a fully funded social security system. In such
a system, the total benefits to a cohort are eaual to the return on the
system's investment of that cohort's contribution. We will limit our
attention to a social security system which does not discriminate on the
bsis of an individual's probability of dying early.8 Therefore,in an
actuarially fair system, the taxes and benefits satisfy
RT =(l—p)S. (21)
It follows from (5) and (21) that the expected net present value of social
security benefits for a type p consumer is
-l p-p (2 -T+A S=-T —
1-p
According to (22) ,theintroduction of fully funded social security increases
the expected lifetime wealth of consumers with a low p (less than p) and
decreases the expected lifetime wealth of consumers with a high p (greater
than p). The effects on the steady state distributions of consumption and
bequests are given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that there exists a unique positive steady
state level of bequests for families of every type p. Then, provided that
S>0 is small, an increase in fully funded social security, RdT=(l-p)dS>O,
WI]] narrow the steady state cross—sectional distributions ofc1, c2 and B*.
Proof. Substituting (22 into (19) yields
p-p
E*(p)=E((B*(p)/G)+ Y -— T,p) (2J
1-p—18-
A; lying the implicitfunction theorem to (23) yiclds
- p-p
dB*(p) =_______ — (24)
dT -lB i—G —1-p
lB _
Since0 <G <1,the coefficient of (p-p) in (24) isnegativeso that
dB*(p) •0
—
dT >asp-p. Thus E*(p) is invariant toT. Since dB*(p)/dp >0
(Proposition 3), it follows that an increase in T causes B*(p) to move
tard B* (p)
Letc *(p)be the steady state level of c. for type p consurrrs.
I i
It follows frorr (9), (ba) and(22)that
p-p
c.*(p) c1((B*(p)/G)+Y_ —T,p) (25)
i-p
















G <1,the coefficient of (p—p) in (2 is
dc.* < —
negative.Therefore 0 as p -p.Hence c.*(p) is invariant to dT
T. Since dC,*(p)/dp > 0(Corollary 3.1), it followsthat anincrease
inT causes ci*(p) to move toward c.*(p). q.e.d.
The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is quite straightforward.
Forconsumerswith a low probability of dying early, the annuity offered-19—
by social security system has a rate of return, ,whichexceeds the
rate of return available from private annuity companies .Thus
an increase in social security effectively raises the wealth of the ccrsuxriers
with p <p.Hence these consumers increase consumption and bequests.
As for consumers with p >P'an increase in social security forces them
to hold annuities with a lower rate of return than on annuities in the
private market; for these consumers, an increase in T effectively lowers wealth
and leads to a reduction in bequests and consumption. Finally observe that for
consumers with p=p, an increase in social security has no effect since these
consumers can undo the effects of an increase in social security by reducinc
their holdings of private annuities.
In Abel (1985a) it was also shown that an increase in the level of
actuarially fair social security will narrow the steady state distributions
of bequests and consumption. It is worth noting how Proposition 4 differs
from the result in Abel (l985a) .Inthe previous paper, there are no
annuity markets, no bequest motive and no heterogeneity of ex ante mortality
probabilities. In the model presented there, all bequests are "accidental";
bequests are equal to the wealth of consumers who die after one period.
The introduction of social security reduces the need to save for retirement
consumption and thus reduces the siz.e of accidental bequests. Since all
)r4tra—cohort variation is due to intra-cohort variation in becuests,
the reduction in all positive bequests reduces intra—cohort variation.
However, in the current paper with actuarially fair annuities, consumers
with the same wealth and the same exantemortality probabilities leave the
same bequestwhether they die young or old. Thus, for consumers with a given
p, thereisno intra—cohort variation in bequests or consumption. The intra-
cohort variation is across consumers with different ex ante ucrtality—20-
probabilities. the extent that the social security system forces' everyone
to hold a particular asset in their portfolios, it reduces the intr-cohort
variation in portfolios and hence in bequests and constnption.—21—
V.The Effects of Social Security on Steady Statc Aggregate Capital and
Surntion
Much of the literature on the effects of social security has focussed
on itseffectsonthelong-run aggregate capital stock. Presumably the
reason for examining the effects on the capital stock is that if the long—
runcapitalstock is belowtheGolden Rule capital stock, then if social
security reduces the long-run aggregate capital stock, it will also reduce
long-run aggregate consumption. The implication of the reduction in aggregate
consumption is evidently that aggregate welfare is reduced. We argue in this
section and the next section that, for two reasons, the emphasis on the long-run
capital stock is misplaced if one is actually interested in Social welfare.
First, as is well-known from the Golden Rule literature, the long-run aogregate
capitalstock and long-runaggregate consnption can xve in opposite
directionsin response to social security. Second, and zrre inortantly,
with heterogeneous consuners, it canhappen that aggregate consuntion is
reducedbut aggregate welfare is increased by social security. This
apparent contradiction can be explained by observing that social security
narrows thedistributionof consumption.
We restrict our attention henceforth tothe case of homothetic utility
as in Hakansson (1969), Fischer (1973), and Richard (1975) .Thereare two
reasons for restricting the utility function to be hornothetic. First, we can
present necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique
steady state which do not require R<G. Second, homothetic utility implies
linear decision rules which are easily aggregated.
Suppose that U(c) and V(B) are characterized by constant and
equal coefficients of relative risk aversion G
1—c C-l U(c) = (28a) 1-0
V(B)=ABl_Cl
(28b) 1-a—22--
Note that U( ) and V( )areeach strictly concave and satisfy the Inada
conditions. Therefore, Propositions 1—4 apply to this specificationof
the utility function.
Homothetic utility is particularly convenient because it implies that
the income expansion path is a ray through the origin. Using (28a,b) ,the




C2= 02Bwhere02 =A° (29b)
Substituting (29a,b) into the lifetime budgetconstraint (9) yields
B(p) =_!_ (I+Y—T+A'S) (30a)
(p)
where (p) 0 +(l-p)R102
+R1 (30b)
it follows from (13b) and (29a,b) that 4(p) in (3Db) is simply
(p, c1, c2, B) evaluated under the assumption of homothetic utility. In
thiscase,'(p, c1, c2, B) is independent of C1, c2, and B and is simply
a decreasing function of p. Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that
the steady state will be unique if G>l. The analogous result for homothetic
utility is given below.
Proposition 5. Suppose that U( )andV( )haveequal constant
degrees of relative risk aversion as specified in (28a,b) .Therewill
be a unique positive steady state level of bequests, B*(p), if and only if
G(p)>1, where (p) is defined in (3Db).
Proof. Setting I equal to B/G in (3Da) yields
B*(p) =G(p)-l
(Y-T+A'S) (31)
which irrmediate1y proves the proposition.—23—
Corollary5. If 6ARI, then there exists a unique steady state
level of bequests.
-i
Proof.If 6RX <1,then E(6RA)0>1.Therefore>1and
>1. q.e.d.
In the remainder of this sectionwe analyze the effects of changes in
fully funded social security on variousaggregate magnitudes in the steady
state. Weadoptthe notational convention ofusing two asterisks to denote
th€ avra€ valuE of a variable in the steady state. For exairtle,
1
B** /B*(p)d}i(p).We will demonstrate below that an increase in fully
0
funded social security decreases aggregate bequests and aggregate consumption
of young consumers in the steady state. The steady state national capital
stock will be increased or decreased depending on whether consumption of
the young is greater or less than the inheritance they receive. Whether
aggregate consumption in the steady state increases or decreases depends on
whether the interest rate exceeds the growth rate as well as whether the
consumptionof the young is greater or less than the inheritance they
receive.
A.Steady State Bequests
Toexamine the effects of fully funded social security on steady state
bequests,substitute (22) into (31) and integrate over all types p to obtain
1I
G - T)dH(p) (32) B** =
0G(p) -l i-p
Itis evident from (32) that an increase in T redistributes resources away
G from consumers with p>p toward consumers with p<p. Since
G(p)-l'
the ratio—24—
of steady state bequests to non—inheritance income,isincreasinQ in ;—,
theredistribution of resources is from consumers with a high value
of
G to consumers with a low value of this factor; hence B** declines.
G (p)-l
9,10
PropositiOn 6. Suppose that U( ) and V( ) have equal constant
relative risk aversion as specified in (28a,b) and that G(p)>l for all
p in the support of H(p). Then an increase in fully funded social security
reduces aggregate bequests in the steady state4 B**.
B. Steady State Consurnption
Now we examine the effects on aggregate consumption of consumers of
each age. The steady state aggregate (per capita) consumption of the
1
young cohort is c1 E1c1*(p)dH(p). Since the ratio of c1 to B is f3]for
all consumers, it follows immediately that
=e1B
(33)
Equation (33) and Proposition 6 lead to
Proposition 7. Under the assumptions of Proposition 6, an increase
in fully funded social security reduces the aggregate consumption of the
young.
Although social security unambiguously reduces the steady state
consumptionofthe young, it can either reduce, raise, or leave unchanged
the steady state aggregate consumption of the old cohort. To understand
why the effect on the consumption of the old is ambiguous, recall that,
in the long run, social security raises both the first-period and
second-period consumption of consumers with p<p and reduces the first-
period and second-period consumption of consumers with p>. Consumers with
p<p represent a larger share of the old generation than of the young
generation because of their higher survival rates. Thus, even though—25-
average first-period consumption is unambiguously reduced in the long
run, it is possible for average second—period consumption to be incxeaseó
in the long run.
Letc2** denotethe steady state consumption (per capita) of the




Thefactor(l-p)G1 reflects the facts that (a) only a fraction (l-p)
oftype p coruxners survives,and (b) each cohort is only Gtirrs as
large as the succeeding cohort. Substituting (25) into (31) .andusing








The factor — , whichis the steady
type p consumers to their bequests, canberewritten using (30b) as






It is clear from (36) that the factor
c(p)—l
is decreasing in p if and
only if (0] +B')G>l. Therefore, since social security transfers resources
from high p consumers to low p consumers, the redistribution is from
(i—p)0
consumers with a low value of the factor
2to consumers with a high G(p)-l
value of this factor if and only if (01 +R1)G>l.Therefore we have
Proposition 8.11 Suppose that tiC )andV( )haveequal constant
coefficients of relative risk aversion as specified in (28a,b) and that





G(01+ R ) 1 (37)
C. The Steady State Cpital Stock
Let K*(p) be the steady state capital stock of type p consumers and
1
K** f K*(p)dH(p) be the aggregate steady state private capital stock. We
will measure K** at the end-of-period, that is, before interest is accrued.
At the end of a period, all privately owned capital is held by young
consumers; the surviving old consumers have already consumed c2 and have
already given the remaining wealth to their heirs. Thus, the private capital
stock is equal to inheritances received by the young, I**, plus net labor
income, Y—T, minus first-period consumption, so that
=I+Y—T—c1
(38)
Since I**=B**/G and c1 =61B**,




Equation (39) and Proposition (6) imply
Proposition 9. Suppose that U( ) and V( ) have equal constant
relative risk aversion as specified in (28a,b) and that G(p) >1for
all p in the support of H(p). Then the effect on the long-run aggregate
private capital stock of an increase in fully funded social securityis
dK** > 0 dT <
—l as 1< (40)
Ina fully funded social security system, the long—run aggregate
national capital stock K.L*, is equal to K** +T,the sum of aggregate private—27—
capital K** and the government capital stock. Therefore, the following
corollary to Proposition 9 is obvious.
Corollary 9.1. If the assumptions of Proposition 9 hold, then
under fully funded social security
dK **
N > > —1
dT<0 as Ol G (41)
To interpret the condition in (40) and (41), observe that since
c1** =O1B**and B**= GI**, we have c1**=G011**. ThaTt is, in comparing
steady states, GO1 is the response of consumption of young consumers to
changes in the inheritances they receive. The introduction of fully funded
social security reduces B** and hence reduces I** and c1**. If GO1 is less
than 1, the reduction in first period consumption is smaller than the
reduction in inheritances and the national capital stock falls. Alternativey,
if GO1 is greater than 1, the reduction in c1 exceeds the reduction in
inheritances and the national capital stock rises.
It is useful at this point to present the aggregate resource constraint
of the economy. In the steady state, the aggregate disposable resources
of the private sector are given by Y +(R/G)K**+(l—p)S/G-Twhere Y -T
is the net labor income of the young, (R/G)K** is the per capita gross
income accruing to privately-held capital carried over from the previous
period, and (l-p)S/G is the per capita social security income of the old.
The private sector uses these resources for consumption c**Ec** +c2
and (gross) capital accumulation K**. Equating c**+K** with total disposable
resources yields
c =Y-T+(1—p)S/G+(R/G—l)K** (42)
Using condition (21) for fully funded social security we obtain—28—
y+ (P/c — 1)(K** +T) (43)
Equation (43)displays the well—known result from the Golden Itile literature
that an increase in the steady state national capital stock leads to an increase,
decrease, or no change in aggregate consumption depending on whether
the net rate of return to capital is greater than, less than, or equal to
the population growth rate.
Equation (43) and Corollary (9.1) imply the following:
Corollary 9.2. Suppose that the assumptions of Proposition 9 hold.
Then, under fully funded social security
dc** >
dT C as [01—G1] ER—C] •0 (4fl
The condition in (44) has a simple interpretation12. The direction of
the effect of social security on the national capital stock is given by
the sign of 6 -G1(Corollary 9.1) .Thedirection of the effect of a change
in thecapital stock onaggregate consumption is given by the sign of
P—C,as is well known fromtheGolden Rule literature.
Propositions 6 through 9andtheir corollaries describe the
conditions underwhichvarious aggregate magnitudes either increase or
decrease in response to anincreaseinfullyfunded social security.
Onlybequests and consumption of the young have unambiguous responses
to social security. The effects on consumption of the old, aggregate
consumption, and the nationalcapital stock are sunwarized in Figure 1.
If asteady state exists, then the directions of the effects ofsocial
—l
















































































































































existence of a steady state depends or €2 Aand max (the largest value
of p in the population) as well.
It is not obvious how one might best choose an estimate for the crucial
parameter 0 in the two-period lifetime model presented above. However,
I will offer a casual guess without pretending it is anything more than a guess.
As is clear from Proposition 9 and its Corollaries, the critical value of
is G'. Recalling that is the steady state ratio of aggregate
consumption of the young to aggregate inheritances received at birth, a
reasonable guess is that the bequest motive is sufficiently weak so that
this ratio is greater than one, which implies that 01>G')3 In addition,
it appears that the marginal product of capital is greater than the populaticn
growth rate so that R1<G1. As is clear from Figure 1, these two guesses irn1y
that the national capital stock, consumption of the old, and aggregate
consumption are all increased by fully funded social security, whereas
aggregate bequests and aggregate consumption of the young are decreased.—31—
VI.Steac,y State Welfare
In this section, we examine the effect of an increase in social
security on the steady state level of aggregate welfare. Our measure
of aggregate welfare is simply the sum of the individual utilities of
all consumers in a given cohort. We demonstrate that if consumers are
sufficiently risk-averse, then the introduction of social security will
increase steady state aggregate welfare.
Let (p) be the maximized value of the individual utility
function (3) subject to the constraints in (1) and (2) .Restrictin
U( )andV( ) to have equal constant relative risk aversion as in






Letc?*(p) bethe steady state value of c2(p).
It is clear from (45) thatfor a given p steady state welfare Q*(p) is
anincreasing function of the steady state bequest B*(p). Therefore, in view
of Proposition 4, an increase in fully funded social security increases steady
state utility for consumers with p<p and reduces steady state utility for
consumers with p>p.
To examine the effects of social security on social welfare, we
of course, need to specify a social welfare function. We use a utilitaria
social welfare function which is the sum of the utility of all consumers
in a given cohort. The steady state level of social welfare is
E*(p)j(p)so that evaluating (45) in the steady state we have
= (p) [B*(p))l_GdN(p) -(P) (46—32--
We will limit our attention to theintroductionof a small amount of social
security into an economy without social security. Substituting (31) into







where 3(p) =-() G(p)-l)lo (47b)
We n state and prove
Proposition 10. Suppose that tJ() andV( )haveequal and constant
relativerisk aversion as specified in (2Eab) and that G(p) >1for all
p in the support of H(p). Then if G(p) >, theintroduction of actuarially
fair social security increases steady state welfare.
Proof. From (47a) and the Lemma, it is clear that dT 0
T0
if J'(p) >0for all p in the support of H(p). Differentiating (47b) with
respect to p and simplifying yields
(p) G(p) -1 G(p): 1 (48)
Since'(p)<0and G(p) —l >0,it is clear that if GG(p) —1>0,then
3'(p) >0.q.e.d.
Corollary 10.1. Suppose that G(p) >1for all p in the support of H(p)
and that c> 1.Then the introduction of actuarially fair social security
increases steady state social welfare.—33-.
We have shown that the introduction of actuarially fair social security
can reduce steady state aggregate consumption but, if the CRRAutility
functions U( ) and \T()display at least as much risk aversion as the
logarithmic utility function, it increases steady state social welfare.
Although a reduction in aggregate consumption may seem, at first, to be
inconsistent with an increase in social welfare, these results are
easily reconciled by the observation that social security reduces the
variation in bequests and consumption (Proposition 4). If the individual
utility functions aresufficientlyrisk averse, the welfare-improving
effects of reduced variance outweigh the welfare-reducing effects of
reduced aggregate consumption.
Corollary 10.1 indicates that if the coefficient of relative
risk aversion is greater than or equal to one, then the welfare-improving
effects of reduced variance are strong enough to raise social welfare.
Alternatively, if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is sufficiently
small, then the introduction of social security will reduce steady state
welfare. A sufficient condition is given in the following corollary.
Corollary10.2.Suppose that 1 <G(p)<forall p in the support
of H(p). Then the introduction of fully funded social security reduces
steady state welfare.—34—
VII.Conclusion
The social security system essentially forces all workers to hold an
annuityin their portfolios. If the rate of return on this annuity is equal
to the rate of return on the private annuities which a consumer holds, thenthe
consumercan offset the effects of social security simply by reducing his
holding of private annuities. However, if the rate of return on social
security differs from the rate available to the consumer in the private annuity
market, then changes in the level of social security will, in general, force
the consumer to change his cons urrtionand/orportfolio behavior. Thus,
in a world in which consumers all face the same rate of return on social
securitybut face different rates of returnon private annuities, changes
in social security will affect the behavior of at least some individuals.
In this paper, we have assumed that each consumer canbuy private
annuitiesat an actuarially fair rate of return. After presenting sufficient
conditions for the existence of a unique steady state equilibrium, we
then established that increased social security narrows the steady state
distributions of bequests and consumption. We showed that fully funded
social security will crowd out steady state private wealth by more than,
less than, or exactly one-for-one depending on whether steady state
consumption of the young is less than, greater than, or equal to steady state
inheritance received by the young. We also established simple conditions
which determine whether steady state aggregate consumption rises, falls,
or remains unchanged. Finally, we showed that if individual utility functions
are sufficiently risk—averse, then fully funded social security increases
steady state social welfare because it reduces inequality; however, if
individual utility functions display very little risk-aversion, then social
welfare is reduced by social security.Re f e r en ce s
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1. See, for example, Yaari (1965), Hakansson (1969), Fischer (l973).
Richard (1975), Barro and Friedman (1977) ,Levhariand Mix-man (1977)
and Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) .Kotlikoffand Spivak (1981) analyze
the role of the family in providing annuities but stop short of a general
equilibrium model in which the distribution of bequests is determined
endogenously.
2. If there are annuities and if consumers derive some utility from
leaving bequests, then in general there will be intra—cohort variation in
bequests received and left by members of the same cohort with
identical ex ante mortality probabilities. (See Abel (1985b) .)Onlyif
therate of return onannuities is actuarially fair will there be no
intra-cohortvariation in bequests by consumers who can live either one
period or two periods.
3. We are using the term "inheritance" torefer to a transfer received from
one'sparent, regardlessof whether the parent is alive.
4. Wefollow Yaari (1965), Hakansson (1969), Fischer (1973) and Richard (1975)
inspecifying utility as a function of the size of the bequest left
to one's heirs. An alternative formulation which gives rise to a
bequest motive is to specify utility as a function of the utility of one's
heirs' as in Barro (1974)
5. More generally we might specify the utility of bequests as a function V(B,G)
where B is the size of the total bequests and each child receives B/G.
However, since G is assumed to be fixed exogenously, we can write the
utility of bequests simply as a function of B.